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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to theoretically investigate the potential benefits that
arise from a cooperative selling a government subsidized area-yield contract (i.e., the
Group Risk Plan). The indeminities in area-yield contracts are triggered by a geo-
graphically determined yield (e.g., a county-wide yield average) instead of the more
conventional individual actual production history. Therefore, an area-yield contract
would be appropriate for managing the cooperative’s systemic throughput risk. The
cooperative would also capture some of the substantial government subsidies that are
normally given to a private insurance company. Our primary finding is that farmers
should be indiﬀerent when considering the decision to purchase area-yield insurance
from a private company or encompass that business in their cooperative. We derive
this result for the specific case of costless insurance and assume a Pareto Optimal con-
tract. Under these assumptions, the government subsidies that the cooperative would
hope to capture are simply a net deduction in their premiums. In other words, the
benefit they capture from the subsidies is the same when they purchase the insurance
from an outside firm or internally.
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1 Introduction
Agricultural cooperatives exist, in part, because they are a risk management strategy for
their members (Sporleder and Goldsmith; Schrader—class; Zeuli). The cooperative can help
mitigate farm price risk by storing, pooling, and selling raw commodities under contract or
by processing the commodities and selling retail products that oﬀer more stable prices than
commodities. Since cooperatives aggregate farm output, an individual’s yield loss is oﬀset
by the other members. This system helps ensure that the cooperative can always meet the
terms of any supply contracts. However, it also exposes the cooperative and therefore the
members (the residual claimants) to throughput and profit uncertainty. This uncertainty
is a function of each member’s yield variability.1 Therefore, the cooperative faces both
independent and systemic yield risk.
Cooperatives can implement several strategies to help manage their throughput risk, the
variability of the firm’s supply of input, although none is without some distinct disadvan-
tage (Zeuli). Some cooperatives have promoted hedge-to-arrive contracts, which guarantee
that each member will deliver a certain volume of grain on a given date (Baumel and
Lasley). New generation cooperatives solve this problem by shifting the risk to the mem-
bers. Farmers enter into quantity rather than yield-based contracts and must purchase the
diﬀerence if they experience any shortfalls. Therefore, although the cooperative is ensured
against throughput risk, the farmer loses one of the benefits of the cooperative form of
business. Some cooperatives have considered oﬀering various yield insurance products to
their members (Black, Barnett, and Hu).
The purpose of this paper is to theoretically investigate the potential benefits that arise
from a cooperative selling a government subsidized area-yield contract (i.e., the Group Risk
Plan). The indemnities in area-yield contracts are triggered by a geographically determined
yield (e.g., a county-wide yield average) instead of the more conventional individual actual
production history (Skees, Black, and Barnett). Therefore, an area-yield contract would
be appropriate for managing the cooperative’s systemic throughput risk. The cooperative
would also capture some of the substantial government subsidies that are normally given to
a private insurance company. The USDA’s Risk Management Agency provides three types
of subsidies (Young, Vandeveer, and Schnepf): they discount the premiums to make the
product more aﬀordable for farmers; they pay the insurance providers a fixed percentage of
gross premiums to cover their administrative and delivery expenses; and they subsidize the
insurance providers’ underwriting risk. Cooperatives may be able to deliver the insurance
at lower cost and pass the administrative cost-savings onto their members (Black, Barnett,
and Hu). Black, Barnett and Hu provide an empirical investigation into a particular case of
1The cooperative purchases as much of its input from its members as possible although they may
purchase product on the open market when faced with shortfalls. This act exposes them to price and
quantity uncertainty.
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the cooperative providing the insurance, but no theory. Mahul (2001) shows theoretically
that insurance programs based on producer’s individual yields have been disappointing due
to the fact that premiums have not been suﬃcient to cover the total cost of insurance. One
alternative to overcome this problem is to replace individual insurance with an area yield
insurance system that strongly reduces both moral hazard problems and insurance’s cost.
We compare two insurance provision scenarios using a standard utility maximizing
framework with a representative farmer agent. In the first model, an area-yield crop
insurance product is sold by a risk neutral agent or privately owned firm (the insured
are not owners). In the second model, the same crop insurance product is sold jointly by
a risk neutral insurer and a cooperative (owned by the insured). In both models we find
Pareto Optimal insurance contracts when insurance is costless (i.e., the administrative and
underwriting costs are zero). We compare the welfare of a representative farmer under
both scenarios and also provide some qualitative extensions that consider heterogeneous
agents.
The paper proceeds as follows. We discuss the context and provide the basic model,
where the area yield insurance is provided by a private company, in section 1. This is
followed by the alternative model exposition, where the insurance is provided jointly by
the cooperative and a private risk neutral insurer. In section 3 we compare the optimal
indemnities under each case and in section 4 we compare the welfare eﬀects. We conclude
the paper by summarizing our findings and suggesting areas for future research.
2 Context and Basic Model (a Private Insurance Provider)
Consider an environment in which there are n farmers (i = 1, 2, ..., n) in some geographically
distinct crop production region who produce the same commodity. The commodity is
characterized by stochastic volume-based (e.g., bushels) yields yi and is sold at a unit
price p. Since all the farmers face the same price, we normalize the commodity price such
that p = 1. To compare parallel situations, we assume that all farmers are members of a
cooperative that processes their crop; in this basic model the cooperative has no relationship
with the insurance provider. The cooperative’s annual profits πf (y) are a function of the
aggregate yield y of the region.The cooperative’s annual profits are specified as follows:
πf (y) = pfF (y)− C(y)
where F is a production function that produces a single final product, pf is the price
of that final good, and C(y) ≥ 0 represents the cost of production. We assume that
F, pf , and C are such that in a relevant domain D ⊂ R+, πf (y) is a twice continuously
diﬀerentiable function of y, increasing and concave. For example, F (y) = yα, α ∈ (0, 1);
pf = 1, C = 0 and D = R+.We let πi(y) = θiπf (y) represent the individual farmer i’s share
of the cooperative’s profits, where θi ∈ [0, 1].
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Following Mahul (1999), and without loss of generality, we project the stochastic indi-
vidual yield yi onto the stochastic area yield y to obtain the following decomposition
yi = µi + βi(y − µ) + εi (1)
where
βi = cov(yi, y)/var(y)
Eεi = 0; cov(εi, y) = 0
Eyi = µi; Ey = µ.
To manage their risk exposure, each farmer may buy area yield insurance coverage
from a private insurance provider (the farmers have no ownership stake in the insurance
company); the farmer will choose an indemnity level I(y) based on the aggregate yield
and be charged a corresponding premium P . A Pareto Optimal insurance contract is
characterized by a premium P ∗ and an indemnity level, I(y)∗, that maximizes the farmer’s
expected utility function subject to a participation constraint for the insurance provider.
Stated more formally, the Pareto Optimal contract solves the following problem:
max
P,I(·)
Eu(Wi) (2)
s.t. pyi + I(y) + πi(y)− P = Wi
0 ≤ I(y)
V0 ≤ V (P −Ec(I(y)) + T ) (3)
where Wi represents the wealth of the farmer. We let V denote the insurance provider’s
utility function, V0 is his reservation utility value, c is an increasing linear function mea-
suring the total administration and underwriting costs of providing the insurance (c ≥ 1)
and T corresponds to an exogenous government transfer that would oﬀset these costs (i.e.,
government subsidies on administration and underwriting costs). We assume that the
insurance provider is risk neutral, V 0 = 1.
At the optimum the participation constraint is binding so the problem can be reduced
as follows:
max
P,I(·)
Eu( yi + I(y) + πi(y)− P ) (4)
s.t. 0 ≤ I(y)
V0 +Ec(I(y)) = P + T (5)
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Substituting (1) we can define the problem more completely as
max
P,I(·)
Eu(µi + βi(y − µ) + εi + I(y) + πi(y)− P ) (6)
s.t. 0 ≤ I(y)
V0 +Ec(I(y)) = P + T (7)
The solution of this problem is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The Pareto Optimal insurance contract that solves problem (6) satisfies
the following conditions:
I(y) = max{βi(yc − y) + (πi(yc)− πi(y)), 0} if βi > 0
I(y) = max{−βi(y − yc0)− (π(y)− π(yc0)), 0} if βi < 0
P = V0 +Ec(I(y))− T
where yc, yc0 are called critical yields and defined by
I(yc) = 0 if βi > 0
I(yc0) = 0 if βi < 0
where we have assumed that
lim
x→0
πi(x) < |βi| if βi < 0 (8)
Proof. See the appendix.2
Some insights about the characterization of critical yields are provided in the next
proposition.
Proposition 2 When the insurance is costless, which means c = 1, the critical yields are
given by the upper and lower bounds of the aggregate yield:
yc = ymax if βi > 0
yc0 = ymin if βi < 0
If the insurance is costly, which means c > 1, the critical yields do not reach the bounds of
the aggregate yield.
Proof. See the appendix.
2Please contact the authors for a copy of the appendix containing all proofs.
5
2.1 A Cooperative is the Insurance Provider
In this section we consider an alternative scenario, one in which the cooperative jointly
with a risk neutral agent (instead of a private insurance provider) sells area-yield insurance
to its members. We assume that the two business divisions are integrated without cost or
additional benefits to the cooperative. The cooperative’s total profit function π is specified
as follows:
π = πf (y) + θ(πS(eI(y), eP ) + T ) (9)
where πf (y) represents profits obtained from the agricultural enterprise (processing) speci-
fied above, πS(eI(y), eP ) represents profits obtained from selling insurance to members and θ
is the participation of the cooperative in the insurance firm. The profits from selling insur-
ance are a function of the aggregate premiums and indemnities purchased by all members:
πS(eI(y), eP ) = nP
i=1
(Pi − cIi(y)).
A Pareto Optimal insurance contract in this scenario is characterized by a premium P ∗,
an indemnity level, I(y)∗, and a share of cooperative profits θ∗ that maximizes the farmer’s
expected utility function subject to a participation constraint. Stated more formally, the
Pareto Optimal contract solves the following problem:
max
P,I(·)
Eu(yi + I(y) + πi(y)− P + θ(P − I(y) + T )) (10)
s.t. 0 ≤ I(y)
V0 = (1− θi)(P −Ec(I(y)) + T ) (11)
We let V denote the utility function of a risk-neutral investor and V0 his reservation utility
value. This specification, which is standard in the insurance literature, is required be-
cause we are dealing with a representative agent. Intuitively, if we consider a group of
heterogeneous farmers in the cooperative (i.e., characterized by diﬀerent β0s) they could
theoretically share each other’s risk. It is possible, however3 that their welfare improvement
over the case where they purchase it from the private insurer would be minimal. However,
if they were also characterized by diﬀerent utility functions, then their welfare gains might
increase.
For ease of exposition, we drop the subscript i in the remainder of our analysis. The
following proposition establishes the Pareto Optimal contract.
3A natural extension of this paper would include this heterogeneous case.
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Proposition 3 If the insurance is costless and the assumption (8) holds, then the Pareto
Optimal insurance contract that solves problem (10) satisfies:
(1− θ)I(y) = max{βi(yc − y) + (πi(yc)− πi(y)), 0} if βi > 0
(1− θ)I(y) = max{−βi(y − yc0)− (π(y)− π(yc0)), 0} if βi < 0
(1− θ)P = (1− θ)Ec(I(y))− (1− θ)T + V0
θ ∈ [0, 1)
where yc, yc0 , the critical yields, are defined by
I(yc) = 0 if βi > 0
I(yc0) = 0 if βi < 0
Proof. See the appendix.
3 Comparing Optimal Indemnities
For the sake of brevity, we restrict our comparison to the case in which the insurance is
costless and β > 0. Given these conditions, we know that the critical yield is as follows:
yc = ymax for all θ ∈ [0, 1)
We denote our base case, when the insurance provider is a private firm, with the
superscript 0, and the alternative, when the cooperative jointly sells the insurance with a
risk neutral agent, with the superscript 1. The indemnity schedule for the representative
farmer can be specified as follows:
I1(y) =
β(ymax − y)
(1− θ) +
(πf (ymax)− πf (y))
(1− θ)
I0(y) = β(y
max − y) + (πf (ymax)− πf (y))
and the connection between the two indemnities is
(1− θ)I1(y) = I0(y)
therefore
I1(y)− I0(y) = θI1(y) ≥ 0; y ∈ [0, ymax].
Given these conditions, we are able to establish the following result.
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Proposition 4 a) When insurance is costless and β > 0, the indemnity schedule for a
representative farmer when the cooperative jointly sells the insurance with a risk neutral
agent is uniformly equal to or greater than when the insurance is sold by a private company.
b) Under the same previous assumptions and when the cooperative runs jointly the
insurance with a risk neutral agent the indemnity schedule is an increasing function of θ
for all y ∈ [0, ymax].
Proof. We already showed that
I1(y)− I0(y) = θI1(y) ≥ 0; y ∈ [0, ymax].
therefore part a) is demonstrated.
Part b) follows by simply noting that g1(θ) = θ1−θ is increasing in θ for all θ ∈ (0, 1).
According to these propositions, when the cooperative runs the insurance jointly with
a risk neutral agent, the farmer looses his ability to share the risk he is facing. In other
words,he would be facing more risk and according to that he requires a higher indemnity
to oﬀset this higher exposure to risk. The same analysis applies when comparing two
scenarios with diﬀerent profits share (θ).Higher θ means more risk exposure and hence a
higher indemnity is required. The scenario is illustrated in figure 1.
Figure 1
Optimal Indemnities
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4 Welfare Analysis
First we would like to compare expected utilities under both scenarios. That is to say
we want to compare Eu(W0) to Eu(W1) where we keep using subindex 0 to denote the
competitive case and subindex 1 to denote the case in which the cooperative is the insurer.
Wj denotes wealth when analyzing case j = 1, 2. The next proposition establishes the
welfare neutrality for the farmer when the cooperative runs the insurance in the case that
the insurance is costless.
Proposition 5 If the insurance is costless then the farmer is indiﬀerent about the scenar-
ios in which the insurance is jointly ran by the cooperative and a risk neutral insurer or it
is ran by a risk neutral insurer alone.
Proof. When the insurance is costless we have that yc = ymax In this case we have for
j = 0, 1.
Eu(Wj) =
Z
y
Z

u(Wj)f(y, )dyd
W have that Ij(y) > 0 for all 0 < y < ymax, j = 0, 1.Therefore, if β > 0 we have
u(W0) = u(µ+ β(y − µ) + ε+ I0(y) + π(y)− P0)
= u(µ+ β(y − µ) + ε+ β(yc − y) + (πf (yc)− πf (y)) + πf (y)− P0)
= u(µ+ ε+ β(yc − µ) + πf (yc)− P0)
but
P0 = V0 +E(I0(y))− T
and
E(I0(y)) = β(y
c − µ) + πf (yc)−Eπf (y)
Therefore we have
Eu(W0) = bu(µ+ β(ymax − µ) + πf (ymax)− V0 −E(I0(y)) + T )
= bu(µ+ β(ymax − µ) + πf (ymax)− V0 − β(ymax − µ)− πf (ymax) +Eπf (y) + T )
= bu(µ− V0 +Eπf (y) + T )
and the same result holds true for the case β < 0. Similarly for i = 1 we have
u(W1) = u(µ+ β(y − µ) + ε+ I1(y) + πf (y)− P1 + θ(P1 + T − I1(y)))
= u(µ+ β(y − µ) + ε+ (1− θ)I1(y)− (1− θ)P1 + πf (y) + θT )
but if β > 0
(1− θ)I1(y) = β(yc − y) + (πf (yc)− πf (y))
9
so
u(W1) = u(µ+ β(y − µ) + ε+ β(yc − y) + (πf (yc)− πf (y))− (1− θ)P1 + πf (y) + θT )
= u(µ+ β(yc − µ) + ε+ πf (yc)− (1− θ)P1 + θT )
but
(1− θ)P1 = (1− θ)E(I1(y))− (1− θ)T + V0
and
(1− θ)E(I1(y)) = β(yc − µ) + (πf (yc)−Eπf (y))
therefore
Eu(W1) = bu(µ+ β(ymax − µ) + πf (ymax)− (1− θ)P1 + θT )
= bu(µ+ β(ymax − µ) + πf (ymax)− (1− θ)E(I1(y)) + (1− θ)T − V0 + θT )
= bu(µ+ β(ymax − µ) + πf (ymax)− (1− θ)E(I1(y)) + T − V0)
= bu(µ+ β(ymax − µ) + πf (ymax)− β(ymax − µ)− (πf (ymax)−Eπf (y)) + T − V0)
= bu(µ+Eπf (y) + T − V0)
which is exactly the same as Eu(W0). It is also straightforward to check that this same
result holds true for the case β < 0.
5 Conclusion
Our primary finding is that farmers should be indiﬀerent when considering the decision
to purchase area-yield insurance from a private company or encompass that business in
their cooperative. We derive this result for the specific case of costless insurance and assume
a Pareto Optimal contract. Under these assumptions, the government subsidies that the
cooperative would hope to capture are simply a net deduction in their premiums. In other
words, the benefit they capture from the subsidies is the same when they purchase the
insurance from an outside firm or internally. We also show that farmers will face greater
risk when they internalize the insurance company, a factor ignored in previous empirical
explorations of this issue. However, the cooperative is able to oﬀset this increased risk
by purchasing more insurance. If the government increased their subsidies so that they
exceeded the premium deductions, the cooperative would clearly capture greater benefits
and be able to pass these on to its members. Although theoretically this scenario is
problematic, since the contracts would no longer be Pareto Optimal, in reality the idea
that the government might consider such a policy as another vehicle for transferring funds
to farmers is plausible.
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Clearly, future research needs to test our findings in an environment with heterogenous
agents, although our results provide some intuition. If the farmers in the cooperative are
heterogenous (i.e., they are characterized by diﬀerent β0s) they will oﬀset each other’s risk,
but their welfare improvement from internally providing the insurance over the case where
they purchase it from the private insurer might be be minimal. If they were also char-
acterized by diﬀerent utility functions, then their welfare gains might increase. However,
any significant welfare gains from the cooperative providing part of the insurance will most
likely come from decreasing delivery and underwriting costs or if they are able to some-
how create some scale economies from the additional business. Future research should also
consider whether the cooperative would face decreased moral hazard problems.
In sum, although we explore the possibility of agricultural cooperatives selling govern-
ment subsidized insurance in a relatively constrained and abstract situation, our results
provide some insights into the viability of this concept and the benefits that farmers might
obtain. Our work also provides the groundwork for additional analysis, which is warranted
given the fact that cooperatives and farmers will continue to face production and through-
put risk, the cost of the risks are greater in terms of firm survival, and the government is
looking for strategies to increase farmer participation in their crop insurance programs.
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